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The Ottoman Empire Part 9
In the formal political structure of the emerging state, women nonetheless sometimes are visible. For example, Nilufer, wife of the second Ottoman ruler, Sultan Orhan (1324–1362), served as governor of a newly
conquered city. Such formal roles for women, however, seem uncommon. More usually, later Ottoman history makes it clear that the wives,
mothers, and daughters of the dynasty and other leading families wielded
power, influencing and making policy through informal channels. For
the early period, c.
1300–1683, we do know that, in common with many
other dynasties, the Ottomans frequently used marriage to consolidate
or extend power. For example, Sultan Orhan married the daughter of a
pretender to the Byzantine throne, John Cantacuzene, and received the
strategically vital Gallipoli peninsula to boot.
Sultan Murat I married the
daughter of the Bulgarian king Sisman in 1376, while Bayezit I married
the daughter of Lazar (son of the Serbian monarch Stephen Du¸san) after the battle of Kossovo. Such marriages hardly were confined to the
Christian neighbors of the Ottomans but often were with other Muslim dynasties as well. For example, Prince Bayezit, on the arrangement
of his father Murat I, married the daughter of the Turcoman ruler of
Germiyan in Anatolia and obtained one-half of his lands as dowry.
Bayezit II (1481–1512) married into the family of Dulkadirid rulers of
east Anatolia, in the last known case of marriage between the Ottomans
and another dynasty.
Another important key to understanding Ottoman success is to look
at the methods of conquest. Here, as in the realm of marriage politics,
we encounter a flexible, pragmatic group of state makers. The Ottoman
rulers at first often allied with neighbors on the basis of equality, sometimes cementing a relationship with marriage.
Then, frequently, as the Ottomans became more powerful, they established a loose overlordship,
often involving a type of vassalage over the former ally. Thus, local rulers –
whether Byzantine princes, Bulgarian and Serbian kings, or tribal chieftains – accepted the status of vassals to the Ottoman sultan, acknowledging him as a superior to whom loyalty was due. In such cases, the
newly subordinated vassals often continued with their previous titles and
positions but nevertheless owed allegiance to another monarch. These
patterns of changing relations with neighbors are evident from the earliest days and continued for centuries.
Thus, for example, the founder
Osman first allied with neighboring rulers, then made them his vassals,
bound to him by ties of loyalty and obedience. During the latter part of
the fourteenth century the Byzantine emperor himself was an Ottoman
From its origins to 1683 27
vassal, as were Bulgarian and Serbian princes, as well as the Karaman
ruler from Anatolia.
At Kossovo in 1389, Ottoman supporters on the
battlefield included a Bulgarian prince, lesser Serb princes, and some
Turcoman rulers from Anatolia. In many cases, patterns of equality between rulers gave way to vassalage and finally direct annexation.
A sharp example of this final phase is 1453, when the relationship between the
Ottoman and Byzantine empires completed its evolution from equality
to vassalage to subordination and destruction.
As Sultan Mehmet the
Conqueror defeated the Byzantine emperor he not only destroyed the
Byzantine Empire but also the vassal relationship which had existed, now
bringing the dead emperor’s state under direct Ottoman administration.
Similarly, Sultan Mehmet ended the alliance and vassal relationships
with the Turcoman rulers of Anatolia and brought them under direct
Ottoman control. In the early sixteenth century, to give another example,
the Ottomans first ruled Hungary as a vassal state but then annexed
it to more effectively govern the frontier.
There was not, however, always a linear progression from alliance to
vassalage to incorporation. Sultan Bayezit II (1481–1512), for example,
reversed his father’s policies and restored Turcoman autonomy (but it is
true that his turnabout in turn was reversed).
After c. 1550, local dynasties
(elected or approved in some fashion by their nobles) retained their power
in several areas north of the Danube, notably, Moldavia, Wallachia as well
as Transylvania. In all three regions, these rulers professed allegiance to
the sultan and paid tribute while, in the first two areas but not the third,
Ottoman garrisons were present. Otherwise, there were few other traces
of Ottoman rule; significantly, for example, no mosques were built. But
these tribute payers served at the pleasure of the sultan and were obliged
to provide troops on his demand.
In a different form, native rule also
held at Dubrovnik (Ragusa) on the Adriatic. The tradition of local rule in
Moldavia and Wallachia, endured until just after the 1710–11 Ottoman
campaign against Russia, ending because of the alleged “treachery” of
the princes. The Ottomans’ relationship with the Crimean khans is still
more fascinating. These descendants of the Golden Horde (the Mongols
of the Russian regions) became vassals of the Ottoman sultans in 1475
and remained so until 1774, when that tie was severed as a prelude to
their annexation by the Czarist state in 1783 (see chapter 3). Throughout,
they also were considered as heirs to the Istanbul throne in the event the
Ottoman dynasty became extinct.
